The main goal of this paper is to analyse whether the fi scal policy of the Czech Republic is anti-cyclical. This analysis is carried out through decomposing the government's balance into its cyclical and structural part. The fi rst diff erences of the structural part are then put in relation to the output gap to determine whether the fi scal policy is pro-or anti-cyclical. Moreover, the correlation of government expenditures and revenues with the business cycle is also subject of our analysis. We also examine whether the fi scal rules which the Czech Republic would have to adhere to once it enters the euro area limit fi scal policy as a stabilizing mechanism. The paper concludes that the fi scal policy in the Czech Republic was for the most part rather of a random character than anti-cyclical during the examined period 1998-2013. This conclusion has two implications. Firstly, there is still room for improvement in fully and consistently utilizing fi scal policy to stabilise the Czech economy throughout economic cycles. Secondly, fi scal rules would not limit the Czech government to practice anti-cyclical fi scal policy if they have been implemented since 1998.
INTRODUCTION
Having the Czech Republic joined the second stage of the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union, the fi nal stage in this integration process is to join the euro area. Adapting euro inherently involves disposing of discretional monetary policy in favour of the European Central Bank (ECB). Therefore it is of paramount importance to a possible entrant country to have other adjusting mechanisms in cases of from the entrant's perspective unfavourable ECB's monetary policy. The primary mechanisms are the fl exibility of the labour market and fi scal policy, see e.g. Mandel, Tomšík (2009) . This paper is focused on the functionality of the later one. Even though fi scal policy as a stabilizing mechanism is to some degree crippled in a small open economy, which is the case of the Czech Republic, it should in principle dampen economic fl uctuations by accumulating surpluses of the government budgets in economic upturns and utilizing them in economic downturns.
The main goal of this paper is to analyse whether the fi scal policy of the Czech Republic is anti-cyclical and thus can be considered as a stabilizing mechanism which helps to stabilise the Czech economy throughout economic cycles. We also examine whether the fi scal rules which the Czech Republic would have to adhere to once it enters the euro area limit fi scal policy as a stabilizing mechanism. The paper does not discuss the effi ciency and legitimacy of the respective fi scal policies. We set our attention to determine the form of the fi scal policy during the years 1998-2013. A similar analysis of the cyclicity of discretionary fi scal policy have been carried out by Gnip (2011) , who focuses on Croatia, as well as Málek (2011) and Czech National Bank (2012) , who both examine the Czech Republic. Another study was conducted by the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic (2007) for the Convergence Programme for the years [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . The contribution of this paper is to extend a current methodology and apply it while determining the cyclicity of fi scal policy in the Czech Republic.
Determining the Form of Fiscal Policy
For the purposes of the analysis, we divided the tools of fi scal policy into two big groups: discretionary fi scal policy and built-in automatic stabilizers. Built-in automatic stabilizers are mechanisms that automatically tend to dampen economic cycle fl uctuations without direct government interventions. These are mainly included in the revenues side of the government budget and take the form of various taxations. On the contrary, discretionary fi scal policies are the interventions in the economy via deliberate manipulations of government revenues and expenditures to promote macroeconomic goals. While built-in automatic stabilizers are by defi nition anti-cyclical, the cyclicity of discretionary fi scal policy is determined by the competence of the government. Thus, in order to determine the form of fi scal policy, we focused on the discretionary fi scal policy.
Structural Primary Balance
We quantifi ed discretionary fi scal policy by the fi rst diff erences of the structural primary balance. The structural primary balance is calculated according to Tab. I. The primary balance is the actual balance adjusted by debt service cost as the government cannot directly infl uence these expenditures in the current period. The primary balance then includes the built-in automatic stabilizers which are caused by the fl uctuations of the real GDP around its potential. These cyclical eff ects have to be fi ltered out to fi nally reach the structural primary balance.
To fi lter out the cyclical eff ect of economic cycle fl uctuations, we used the semi elasticity of the primary balance of the government's budget. Semi elasticity in principle gives the percentage change in the primary balance to GDP ratio in response to a one percent divergence of real GDP from its potential (ceteris paribus, i.e. holding constant all the other determinants of the primary balance). More formally, see e.g. Mourre et al. (2013) :
Given the semi elasticity, we can adjust the primary balance as follows: structural primary balance potential GDP primary balance output gap semi elasticity × real GDP potential GDP
where output gap = real GDP − potentialGDP, semi elasticity = 0.39.
Equation (1) says that in order to calculate the structural primary balance, the primary balance must be decreased by additional tax revenues and smaller unemployment benefi ts due to positive output gap (i.e. economy working above its potential). Vice versa, the economic recession decreases the primary balance by the amount of the excessive spending on unemployment benefi ts and lower tax revenues. We need to add this sum back to the primary balance to obtain structural primary balance.
We assumed that the semi elasticity is at the constant level of 0.39 for the whole examined period. The assumption that the semi elasticity reasonably oscillates around 0.39 can be supported by the reference from Girouard and André (2005) , where the semi elasticity for the Czech Republic is estimated at 0.38 for 1996 and 0.39 for 2000 and 2003. A similar value, 0.35 for the period 1994-2000, is listed in Bezděk et al. (2003) . Comparable values may be found in Mourre et al. (2013) as well. The fact that the semi elasticity is in relatively strong positive correlation with the share of the government expenditure on domestic output (Fig. 1 ) and the stability of this share in the Czech Republic over time imply the stability of the semi elasticity.
The estimations of the primary structural defi cits to GDP are presented in Tab. II. The data of the real GDPs and the output gaps were collected from Eurostat and the OECD Economic Outlook, respectively. All the partial calculations can be found in the annex of this paper. The following information can be inferred from Tab. II: • The structural balance was in defi cit throughout 1998-2012, no matter whether the government was right or le -wing orientated. Moreover, the structural defi cits of [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] were notably masked by the positive cyclical component of the primary balance. For example, in 2007 the structural defi cit equalled to −2%, but due to the positive output gap the primary defi cit was positive 0.36%, incidentally the only positive primary defi cit in the observed period. This tells us that the government did not take the advantage of the sound economic situation during [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] to accumulate surpluses for the bad times, which came later on with the outburst of the fi nancial crisis.
• The primary balance breakdown also displays the fact that the government had a greater impact on the defi cit of the primary balance than the latest fi nancial crisis itself as the primary defi cits were predominantly made up of the structural defi cits.
• The right-wing orientated political parties built their campaign on promoting fi scal responsibility before the elections to the lower house of the Czech parliament in 2010. Moreover, they claimed if we were not fi scal responsible, we might as well end up in the situation of so called "Greek bankruptcy". Such an aggressive campaign could have been one of the factors which helped the two major right-wing parties win the elections and form the government for 2010-2013. Though the fi scal eff ort of this government is evident, can we consider it as fi scal responsible since its overall balances were still in defi cits?
Determination of Policy Using Phase Diagram
Having estimated the discretional component of the fi scal policy, the next step is to defi ne the cyclicity of the fi scal policy. The following approach of determining the fi scal cyclicity is adapted from Deroose, Larch, Schaechter (2008) . Pro-cyclical fi scal policy is defi ned as the policy during which the government either increases the structural primary balance while the real product is under its potential (II. quadrant of Fig. 2 ) or decreases the structural primary balance while the real product is above its potential (IV. quadrant).
On the contrary, anti-cyclical policy is characterised by either decreasing the balance when the real product is under its potential (III. quadrant) or increasing the balance in times of positive output gap (I. quadrant). The results of our observations are summarised in Fig. 3 . Fig. 3 shows that discretional fi scal policy was anti-cyclical in 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 and pro-cyclical in the remaining years 1999, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2013 . Needless to say, our ex-post assessment of the fi scal policy is rather strict. had, its interventions would be time-lagged. But since the government makes these decisions, it is responsible for them and thus the strictness is in place.
Due to the sensitivity of the calculations of the output gap and the semi elasticity (both values are estimates), we extended the model from Deroose, Larch, Schaechter (2008) by excluding the observations close to the horizontal and vertical axes. We excluded observations within ±0.5% from each axis (the grey cross in Fig. 3) for two reasons. Firstly, excluding observations in the area of ±0.5% near each axis results in better accuracythe chance of error, i.e. marking pro-cyclical policy anti-cyclical and vice versa, is lowered. Supposing the correct estimation of the semi elasticity, the observations outside the grey cross would shi to the neighbouring quadrant only if the output gap was substantially misestimated. Secondly, the exclusion also indicates that we include only distinctively pro-cyclical or anti-cyclical fi scal policies in our analysis. When the economy works at its potential (the grey area around the vertical axis), the substantial changes of structural primary balance do not tell us anything about the cyclicity of the fi scal policy. The grey area around the horizontal axis then describes the situations when there might be a big output gap, however the changes of the structural primary balance are small and thus do not give evidence of the cyclicity.
So a er the exclusion, the number of anti-cyclical fi scal policies accounts for 5 (56%) out of 9 during the analysed period. The rest 4 are pro-cyclical. To confront our results, we compared them with the ones of the Czech National Bank (2012), see Tab. III. The results diff er in 2011, which we ascribe to the diff erent estimation of the output gap. When the CNB carried out their analysis in 2012, it worked with the negative output gap, while we worked with the revised estimation of the positive output gap from 2014. The diff erent result might as well be down to a diff erent methodology used for cyclically adjusting the government's defi cit or diff erent criteria for determining the cyclicity of fi scal policy. Fig. 3 also well describes the time development of the structural defi cit and fi scal policies. While the observations under the horizontal axis imply the deepening of the structural defi cits and fi scal expansions, the observations above the horizontal axis imply improving structural balances and fi scal restrictions. According to Keynesian economics, see e.g. Newman (1998) , the ideal walk on Fig. 2 should be from I. and III. quadrant. Once the fi scal policy ends up in quadrant III. due to an economic downturn, it should then return to quadrant I. when the economy recovers to decrease defi cits. Thus, the observations should ideally fi ll only quadrants I. and III. Such an ideal situation would inherently involve the oscillation of the government debt or savings around zero. As it can be seen from Fig. 3 , the Czech government has been unsuccessful in conducting a proper return walk to quadrant I, failing thus to accumulate proper surpluses.
Decomposition of Fiscal Impulses
We took advantage of the process of adjusting the balance to GDP ratio using the semi elasticity and calculated potential revenues and potential expenditures as percentage of potential GDP. By potential revenues/expenditures we understand revenues/expenditures that would be observed if real GDP was ceteris paribus equal to potential GDP. To calculate these, we used the semi elasticity of revenues (ser) equal to −0.06 and the semi elasticity of expenditures (seg) equal to −0.45 from Mourre et al. (2013) , which are used to calculate semi elasticity of overall balance using the following simple formula: semi elasticity = ser − seg.
We assumed, as previously, these numbers to be valid throughout the whole observed period. Thus we can adjust equation (1) The plotted results in Fig. 4 are interpreted analogously to Fig. 3 . Again, we are interested in the fi rst diff erences, however -in this case of potential revenues/expenditures -with respect to the output gap. The quadrants now therefore indicate whether the revenues and expenditures tend to act pro-or anti-cyclical. Notice, that in order to retain the interpretation of quadrants in accordance with the Fig. 3 and Fig. 2 , the fi rst diff erences of expenditures are plotted with negative sign (e.g. in 2004 the expenditures decreased by approximately 6%, which combined with the negative output gap yields the procyclical expenditures' impulse). We also excluded the observations which present the absolute value of fi scal impulse (the fi rst diff erence) of the revenues/ expenditures lower than 0.5% or observations with absolute value of output gap lower than 0.5%.
The results are as follows: the impulses of the revenues were anti-cyclical in 56% of the cases, whereas the expenditures acted anti-cyclically in 43%. In years 1998, 2002 and 2003 we classifi ed both revenues and expenditures even though their mutual eff ects were excluded when analysing structural primary balance as they netted each other so that the overall impulse was not above 0.5%. The interpretation may be that the fi scal policy is chaotic, when one arm (the one taking) does not know what the other (the one spending) is doing. 
4: Potential revenues' and expenditures' impulses in phase diagrams
Source: authors' calculation on only one fi scal impulse channel, rather than combining both. The results graphically displayed in Fig. 4 are summarised in Tab. IV.
Determination of Policy Using Correlation
To look on the matter from another angle we have decided to analyse the correlation of government expenditures and revenues (at prices fi xed at 2005 levels) with the business cycle represented by the output gap as defi ned above. We are aware of the fact that due to given constant government spending to GDP ratio and growing GDP, we do observe an upward dri in expenditures and revenues. This dri problem is clearly visible in the following graphs, where observations from earlier periods are at the bottom of the graph which in response means a weaker correlation. Therefore, we shall be more interested in the sign of the correlation rather than in its actual number.
Again, we need to adjust the actual values of revenues and expenditures to their values when GDP is at its potential. Since unemployment benefi ts form a negligible part of the government expenditures, in the following text we assume the actual expenditures to be equal to the potential expenditures. As we have stated earlier, revenues include the impact of the majority of automatic stabilisers such as decreases and increases in income, corporate and consumption taxes, VAT etc. Therefore the entire cyclical defi cit is made up of cyclical revenues. Thus:
potential expenditures = expenditures, potential revenues = revenues − cyclical defi cit.
If the economy is working above its potential, we observe a positive cyclical defi cit. In case of expenditures we say that automatic stabilisers have no eff ect. Actual revenues however are larger due to increased tax revenues, so in order to calculate potential revenues, we have to discount excessive revenues. Since we do not assign any part of the cyclical defi cit to expenditures in this section, we discount the whole cyclical defi cit from revenues.
Firstly, we deal with potential expenditures. Governments tend to operate with expenditures in times of crises, which is a logical choice; money le to panicking people by lowering taxes would not be spent. So programs like scrappage, infrastructure (remember construction is usually hit hard), science and development, military, space, etc. are being introduced. Anti-cyclical fi scal policy is therefore characterised by a negative correlation between the output gap and potential expenditures and vice versa. That would imply a restriction in spending during economic booms and an expansion during busts. Correlation close to zero is expected for a-cyclical policy. The actual correlation coeffi cient in the 1998-2013 period, as illustrated by Fig. 5 , is 0.241. This fi nding supports the previous conclusion about the character of fi scal policy, i.e. it is for the most part not in strong correlation with the economic cycle.
As for revenues, anti-cyclical fi scal policy is characterised by positive correlation between the output gap and revenues whereas pro-cyclical policy is, on the other hand, characterised by negative correlation. Anti-cyclical policy would imply rising revenues during upturns and decreasing revenues during downturns. A correlation close to zero is again expected for a-cyclical policy. As it is illustrated by Fig. 6 , the correlation is still positive, equal to 0.157, and discretionary potential revenues therefore behave a-cyclically since the correlation is almost zero. This supports the previous analysis.
As we have mentioned earlier, the results of regressions suff er from the dri problem. We had therefore replaced the nominal measures of expenditures (only in case of expenditures, since we assumed revenues would behave in the same manner) with percentages of GDP and the fi rst diff erences represented by yearly changes of expenditures. We had calculated correlations and linear regressions for various couples, illustrated by Tab. V. They yield the same results supporting a-cyclical or moderate tendency to a pro-cyclical behaviour of expenditures.
Fiscal Policy and Rules
If the Czech Republic enters the euro area which means that it would no longer be able to practise an isolated monetary policy, the question is whether the fi scal rules embodied in the recently The results in this study show that the SGP has not been preventing the Czech government from practicing anti-cyclical discretionary fi scal policy since the discretionary fi scal policy was for the most part a-cyclical. Moreover, the design of the SGP does not even limit the fi scal policy to be anti-cyclical as a whole (discretionary fi scal policy and built-in automatic stabilizers). The 3% limit on the actual defi cit of the government's budget, which involves about 1% 2 limit on the structural balance prescribed by the reformed SGP presents comfortable room for built-in automatic stabilizers. Suppose the model example where the semi elasticity is 0.39 and the structural primary balance zero. The output gap would then have to exceed negative 7.69% (= 0.03/0.39, see equation 1) of potential GDP to deprive the government of its discretionary policy as the 3% limit of the government's budget defi cit would be exhausted by built-in automatic stabilizers and would not leave any space for discretionary fi scal policy. 
B(t) = R(t) − G(t) + D(t) F(t) = B(t)/Y(t) R(t) = F(t) − [e × O(t)] S(t) = R(t) × 100 (%) T(t) = R(t) − R(t − 1) U(t) = T(t) × 100
1998 −76 642 −0.037 went even worse, it would require the government to react to fulfi l the 3% limit the of government's defi cit. In this case, the discretionary fi scal policy would have to be automatically pro-cyclical. However, such an extreme scenario is unlikely. For example, the biggest output gap in the Czech Republic was so far "only" 4.3% of potential GDP in 2013, which le 1.33% for the structural defi cit in the actual defi cit; this is more than prescribed by the reformed SGP.
CONCLUSION
From the above-mention results, we conclude that the fi scal policy in the Czech Republic was for the most part rather of a random character than anti-cyclical during the examined period 1998-2013. This conclusion implies that there is still room for improvement in fully and consistently utilizing Czech fi scal policy as a stabilizing mechanism. If not improved, the tendency to a random fi scal policy can be one of the arguments speaking against the Czech Republic entering the euro area in the near future.
Although the 1% limit on the structural defi cit can limit anti-cyclical discretionary fi scal policy as a stabilizing mechanism in times of long and deep recessions, we conclude that this limit is suitable taken the results of our study. Increasing the limit would probably lead to larger defi cits throughout economic cycles.
